

Books by the Same Author

A REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, 1942

REALITY AND VALUE, 1938

THE MIND IN ACTION, 1930

INSTINCT AND PERSONALITY, 1928

God In Us

*A Liberal Christian Philosophy of Religion
for the General Reader*



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Contents

PREFACE	ix
I. HAVE WE OUTGROWN RELIGION?	1
II. WHERE DO WE FIND GOD?	23
III. HAS MAN A SOUL?	46
IV. WHAT IS GOD LIKE?	63
V. IS GOD REVEALED IN HISTORY?	86
VI. IS CHRISTIANITY THE FINAL RELIGION?	112
VII. MUST RELIGION BE INSTITUTIONALIZED?	140
INDEX	161

Preface

THIS BOOK has been written in response to a number of requests from readers and reviewers of my previous work, *A Realistic Philosophy of Religion* (Willett, Clark & Company, Chicago, 1942). Its purpose is, first, to present the liberal Christian philosophy of the earlier work in a way that can be readily understood by the ordinary educated young person without the assistance of a teacher. Second, to discuss from the same point of view a number of questions only lightly touched upon in the earlier work, such as revelation, sin and salvation, the nature of Christ, Christian institutions, prayer, miracles, and the argument from design. Readers of the former book will find some of the same things freshly and more simply stated, but most of the subject matter is entirely new.

To achieve simplicity I have abandoned dialectic. In writing for students of philosophy it is necessary to state and criticize many alternative theories. This makes very difficult reading for those not familiar with the views discussed. In this book, therefore, I have reduced this type of argument to a minimum. I have, instead, gone straight to the relevant facts, stated the questions they raise, and then proceeded to draw from them the interpretation they seem most consistently to suggest. Those who wish to pursue the subject into critical dialectic I would ask to read my two earlier works in this field, *A Realistic Philosophy of Religion* (1942) and (still more metaphysical) *Reality and Value* (1937).

Liberal Christianity has for fifty years or more been seeking solid ground whereon to set its feet. The thesis here presented claims to have found such solid ground by showing that the disinterested will to the good of others is the activity of God within us. At the same time it claims to preserve the essential truths which have made Christianity a power for the salvation of the individual and society. As such it refutes the charges of the old and the new orthodoxies while admitting much that is of importance in their insights, especially those of the latter. It also rejects the negations of the humanists and agnostics, though adapting itself to what seems valid in their critique of the religious tradition. It presents a philosophy and theology that claim to be true to the scientific knowledge of our day and to the deepest historic insights into man's religious experience. It rejects and reinterprets much of traditional Christian theology but claims that the new interpretation is more true to the spirit and thought of Christ. It proceeds by the methods and in the spirit of liberal Protestantism, but recognizes the errors in that tradition and returns to find deep elements of truth in much that it has frequently discarded.

In a field where so many have labored it seems like an impertinence to claim to say something that is fresh and true. But what seems fresh and true to the author may seem so to others. At least it contributes its quota to that never ending labor of thought whereby truth is found and maintained.

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religion that a person does not practice, except under emotional impulse in times of danger or distress, is not very convincing to anybody. It is easy to compare it to a mere superstition, which a man rationally ignores in his ordinary affairs but turns to as a last resort in his difficulties or relapses into in moments of emotional distress. It suggests that the belief in God is merely a product of wishful thinking, something that people try to believe in because it is a comfort in times of trouble to think of an omnipotent helper, and a consolation in face of disappointment and death to think of an eternal reward in an afterlife.

Perhaps there are some people who believe in God simply for the comfort they get out of it. But there are also a great many people who doubt or disbelieve in God because of the discomfort they have found in the idea. The traditional and orthodox picture of God is not a very comforting one. The modern tendency to believe that God is so full of love and mercy that we can neglect him, ignore his will, follow our own selfish desires entirely, and still turn to him for help in time of need, is in large part a product of wishful thinking. But this is not the traditional picture of God. In that picture God loves his children, but makes very difficult demands of them. He is full of mercy, but he is just. He rewards and he punishes. He is able and willing to save. But the way of salvation calls for discipline. The further we go back in history the more do we find the emphasis on discipline.

Whatever may be true of some modern modifications, man's original belief in God was not a product of wishful thinking. God was primarily one to be feared. Christianity taught that those who honor and trust him

find him one to be loved. But the Father who receives the prodigal is still the source and upholder of the moral law. And who among us is not conscious of having broken the moral law? Thus wishful thinking is more often a cause of unbelief than of belief in God.

GOOD AND BAD RELIGION

The sort of religion that manifests itself only in appeals to God for help is but a weak remnant of a faith which arose because men believed that the moral law is rooted in a will that is greater than their own, and that the moral law is good, an instrument of love. The religion that is practiced only in foxholes is a poor surviving fragment of a faith that inspired our fathers to demand from kings and tyrants the recognition of the equal rights of every man to think for himself, to speak his thoughts, and to have his person respected before the law. That religion gave them courage to fight for freedom because they believed that freedom was a law of God, above the laws made by men. Before that God they bowed in humility and fear. And yet they trusted in his justice and love. He was no product of wishful thinking. Wishful thinking may rob a man of his religion. It may drain the power from it by soft-pedaling the moral element and leaving only a Santa Claus who brings us gifts. But it is not the original source or chief sustainer of belief in God.

If on D-Day people prayed who had long neglected prayer, if men have prayed in foxholes who never prayed before, it was not because their anxious wishes created faith or strengthened it. It was because they had long retained in the back of their minds a belief in a rule of right and wrong that is above the desires of men, and in a Power who upholds that rule and who therefore is just

and good. They may often have failed to follow his rule, but they still believed in his goodness and in some possibility of his power to help them. And so they prayed. The prayer was a natural expression of a faith that rested on something much deeper than their wishes.

But if it was merely a prayer for help in a physical difficulty, divorced from all consideration of right and wrong, it was illogical and unworthy. It ignored the deeper basis of faith, the conviction that the moral order derives from an authority that is more than human. It tried to avail itself of God's love without thought of his righteousness. And an appeal to love without thought of righteousness is an appeal for favoritism. It is a relapse to the primitive man and the pagan, who think of a god who specially rules and guards his chosen tribe, or a god who can be bribed with promises and offerings to work miracles in the special interest of individuals.

If those who say we ought to have outgrown religion meant merely that we ought to have outgrown such primitive and spasmodic expressions of it they would be right. But they mean much more than that. They mean that we ought to have outgrown the conception that there is any source or support of the moral law above the desires of human beings. They believe that modern science has undermined all ground for belief in any being higher than man, to whom we may look for guidance and aid, either in things spiritual or in things material. They tell us that religion, even at its best, is merely a survival of ancient superstitions, a hankering after unattainable blessings, a reverence of nonexistent authority. They usually fail to recognize the strength it brings to the moral life. Or if they recognize this they charge that it

is too dearly bought at the price of rigid adherence to outworn codes, opposition to freedom of thought, and waste of effort on futile ceremonies.

These charges against religion are not without foundation. But they go too far. They throw out the wheat with the chaff. What our religion needs is not a tornado to blow it away, but a winnower to sift it. It is true that science has shown many religious ideas and arguments to be untenable. It is true that religious thought harbors still some superstitions of a bygone age, that it sometimes imposes outmoded restrictions, opposes freedom and wastes effort. So does every other human institution. The congress, the law courts, the economic system and the army must be constantly overhauled and revised to incorporate new knowledge and adapt them to new conditions. So must our religious beliefs and practices.

There is a core of permanent truth and value in all these things. But it has to be related to factors which are constantly changing and only half understood. Sometimes it becomes almost lost under an accumulation of these extraneous factors. Then we need a revolution or a reformation. But the revolt ends in disaster unless it succeeds in recovering and reinstating the core of truth and value. That is what we need to do today with our religion. This book is an attempt to winnow the wheat from the chaff, and to show that it is real wheat.

RELIGION AND SOCIAL ORDER

Every human society has its religion. And everywhere religion performs the same essential function. It is the cement that binds the society together. It upholds the social structure. This is the statement of Dr. R. R. Marett, of Oxford, one of our greatest living anthropol-

ogists. This idea is also involved in the root meaning of the Latin word. *Religio* means to tie up, or bind. People who don't want to be tied up in any way don't want religion. But we can't have a social order without some restraints. We need laws and lawmakers and administrators. And if there is no law recognized above the lawmakers and administrators they tend to become tyrants. Even if the will of the people is recognized as above that of the rulers this will tend to become tyrannical, or split into selfish class interests and resultant chaos, unless it recognizes a higher will above it that is concerned with the good of all. This is the lesson of history.

If a people to any great extent loses its religion it relapses into chaos or slavery. We see this in ancient Greece and modern Germany and among many primitive tribes. Anthropologists constantly warn administrators who have to deal with primitive people that they must respect tribal religion, change it only gradually, always waiting until some equally effective belief can take the place of the old, or they will demoralize the tribe. There was a great loss of religion in ancient Greece which was followed by chaos and tyranny. Newly won liberties of the democracies were lost to dictatorships because they recognized no adequate restraints. Enlightened and democratic Athens made herself an imperialistic tyrant and brought resultant ruin upon herself. The old Greek religion, which had given some cohesion to the early Greek tribes and social order, was inadequate and out of date by the time of Pericles. Some of the Greek philosophers tried to purify it and improve it. But their influence was too little and too late. Greek society could find no higher law, in which men sufficiently believed, to keep within bounds the selfishness

of individuals, classes and petty states. Division, violence and injustice went unchecked, and at last the quarreling communities fell under the tyranny first of Macedon and then of Rome. Some degree of order was restored, but liberty was lost.

Loss of religion is not the only cause of social chaos, reaction and decay. But it is significant that where religion loses its influence, either through unbelief or by failing to keep up with the life of the times, social disaster tends to follow. The French Revolution is an example of this tendency. The controlling hierarchy of the church had become so corrupt and so closely connected with the effete and predatory ruling class that it became the opponent of necessary reform. The democratic regime sought clumsily to reform the church, with resultant clash of consciences and moral confusion. The Paris mob fell under the influence of antireligious leaders, who led it to terrible extremes. The terror and moral confusion thus initiated made impossible the difficult task of welding the contending parties into a stable democracy, and from chaos the republic passed into the dictatorship of Napoleon.

France still suffers from lack of a religion that can retain the respect of independent thinkers and support popular reforms. Atheism is today very widespread among the upper classes. And atheism recognizes no moral law above purely human desires. It can find no logical reason why any individual or class should sacrifice its own interests for those of another. So when many of these people became convinced that it was in their individual interest and that of their class to collaborate with Hitler rather than fight for democracy they did so. Except for a sense of shame and love of France many

others would have done so. The forces of resistance have been found, in France as in the rest of Europe, chiefly in two places. First, among those who, like General de Gaulle, believed in liberty and human rights on religious grounds. Even Pétain was saved by his religion from complete cooperation with the Nazis. Second, among the Communists who, though they do not believe in God as source of a higher moral law, nevertheless have a deep personal interest in and a strong loyalty to another type of social order (opposed to fascism) which they believe is destined to triumph.

Because of its very definite philosophy and political program, communism has almost the effect of religion in giving drive and direction to ethical ideals. But it has a narrow class outlook on present-day problems and encourages ruthlessness in dealing with them. Stalin's harsh treatment of kulaks and Trotskyists is quite consistent with Marxian ethics. But the Russian people as a whole have not lost their religion. And the Russian church has for many years given support to the Soviet economic program. It has also helped buttress the spiritual resistance of the people in the trials of war. Stalin has shown his wisdom in that, though himself still an unbeliever, he has come to recognize the value of religion in the life of the state.

RELIGION IN CHINA

Another example of social collapse following on loss of religious support is to be found in modern China. The Chinese have not lost their religion, but they have lost the connection between their political system and their ancient religion. Confucianism, like every other historic religion, is a mixture of truth and error. It con-

tains many noble teachings, but it is not adapted to modern conditions. It teaches that there is a supreme being, identified with Heaven, who is the source of the moral law. The principal duty of this moral law is filial piety, honor and obedience to one's parents. The whole empire is one great family, with the emperor as its rightful head. The emperor is the son of Heaven. He alone worships Heaven on behalf of his people, who pay reverence to their own ancestors and may worship minor deities, but not Heaven. Thus the emperor is the sole link between Heaven and the common man, and his authority is unquestionable so long as he wields it in accord with the laws of Heaven—laws which even the common man finds imprinted in his heart, and which teach him benevolence, justice, wisdom, sincerity and propriety.

This noble religion was well adapted to the needs of the Chinese people until modern times. It supported an orderly civilized life, peace, and classical culture over the vast area of China. But the Manchu Dynasty stood in the way of progress. The young Chinese who had been educated abroad saw the intellectual flaws in the system. In 1911 they conspired to overthrow the imperial dynasty and established in its place a democratic republic. But for the common people this took the keystone out of the arch of their moral and political system. The new president was not the son of Heaven, and did not claim to be. There was no higher divine law supporting his authority, or that of the officials appointed by him, or that of the elected members of the new legislative bodies. Ambitious men swiftly began to turn their new power to their own interests. Civil war, corruption and banditry spread throughout the land. At length a little company

of sincere patriots, led by a Christian medical man, Sun Yat Sen, and Chiang Kai-shek, gained control of the city of Canton, and set out to unify the country.

The inspiration of this movement lay in the conviction of its leaders that the divine law upholds, not the authority of an emperor, but the right of the people to life and security, to the means of livelihood and the opportunity for self-government. They stated their ideal in terms drawn from China's ancient ethics. Patriotism and the bitter lessons of chaos have combined to win acceptance for it. It has become to millions of Chinese a new religion, whether or not directly associated with the Christianity which is its source. It is this combination of patriotism, ethics and religion, underlying the new democratic movement in China, that gives it hope for success where the earlier movement failed.

RELIGION IN EUROPE

Turning again to Europe we find the prime example of social collapse following loss of religion in Nazi, Germany. Nowhere in the world has the modern spread of unbelief gone further than in Germany. But it has gone far among all the other peoples of Europe too. Germany is merely the extreme case of a general symptom. And much of the blame for this state of affairs must be laid on the religious organizations of Europe.

In the English-speaking world, tolerance—the right to freedom of thought and speech on religious matters—was asserted and acknowledged as a *religious* principle back in the days when religious issues were still the most vital and serious questions before the minds of men. In Europe religious freedom was not granted until people had begun to grow indifferent to religious questions.

The state churches attempted to suppress all nonconformity, and largely succeeded. To do this they allied themselves in every way with the powers dominant in the state. Thus, in Europe, any opposition to the existing class rule had perforce to oppose the church. The liberal and democratic movement therefore became an anti-religious movement. In England and America, on the contrary, it found its inspiration and support in those churches that had broken with the state church in the name of freedom of conscience.

This situation reveals one of the points where the religious man needs to exercise eternal vigilance and frequently fails. The central thought of religion is that of a divine moral law which is above the desires of men. Thus religion becomes a great buttress of the social order that society has developed for its own welfare and believes to be good. It is easy then to identify the existing law of the land with the divine will, instead of recognizing that, at its best, it is but a fallible human attempt to execute the divine will. A lazy habit of mind tends to grow to regard the constitution as sacred, whether it is monarchical, aristocratic or democratic. And this is all the easier for those who benefit by special privileges under the constitution. Churches and churchmen that are given special privileges are not the least guilty in this respect.

Thus there arose in Europe an alliance between privileged classes in church and state. Those who were injured by these special privileges naturally came to regard the church as their enemy, as well as the ruling class in the state. There was no other religious group in the community, recognized, tolerated and strong, from whom they could receive inspiration and help. So they

became antireligious, rebelling against the existing economic and political order, and hating and despising the religious organization that supported injustice in the name of God. In England and America these same tendencies are present, but to a lesser degree. Liberal and democratic movements have found leaders in free and democratic churches; in England, recently, also in the state church. Communism is a foreign rather than a native movement in both countries.

On the European continent, however, the battle lines were tightly drawn. The Greek and Roman Catholic churches and the Protestant state churches, with only minor exceptions, have tended to support political reaction. Political radicalism has been antireligious. As a result the church has lost in spiritual power, has failed in its social function, which is to be the most sensitive part of the community conscience, calling attention to evil and injustice on every hand. It has also lost the confidence of the masses of the community whom it ought to have aided in their struggle. And it has, lost the respect of the upper classes themselves, because it has condoned their selfishness when it should have condemned it. Further, because it had lost respect and was failing in its function, it failed to attract into its leadership that great supply of able and sincere men which it needs. It became intellectually sluggish, conservative and backward. Or else it slavishly gave way to the vigorous attacks of intellectuals and watered down its teaching to something meaningless, instead of thinking its way boldly through the problems created by modern science and history.

This indictment of the church in Europe may sound too strong. And it could be turned, though with less-

ened force, against the churches of the English-speaking world. But it remains true that in Europe, to a greater degree than in Britain and America, and in Germany to the greatest degree of all, the Christian churches before the war had lost the respect of both the upper and lower classes of the community. Religion was at a low ebb.

Just at this time Europe, and especially Germany, were required to face a double crisis which called for high moral resolution and idealism. One feature of this crisis was the rise of nationalism. Throughout the nineteenth century the peoples of Europe had been steadily winning their independence and unity. National pride everywhere aspired to gather all those of one distinctive speech and culture into a distinctive national unit and make it great. This process culminated in the treaty of Versailles. It was impossible to satisfy the conflicting aspirations of all countries and many of the decisions naturally went against defeated Germany. It was a hard blow for this strong and proud people to see other nations' aspirations satisfied, but not theirs; some even at their expense. National pride called for justice — and revenge. The other feature of the crisis was the economic blizzard that swept across the world from 1929 to 1935. It called for high statesmanship to adjust the claims of contending classes, all of whom felt injured by a course of events beyond their control.

Difficult times always tempt us to seek remedies that lie outside the moral law. Germany, having lost too much of that religion which supports the moral law, listened to the tempter. "It is not your fault that you are beaten in battle and poor. It is the Jews. They betrayed you; and they flch your money and your jobs from you. Revenge yourselves on them. Turn them

out of their jobs. Take their money. Run them out of the country. Build yourselves an army again. The chance will come to use it. You are the superior race. You can impose your will on others. You can avenge their insults. You can make yourselves rich on the spoils." It was a seductive program. Martin Luther or Immanuel Kant would have scorned it. They believed in an eternal moral law. But too many of the Germans of the twentieth century had ceased to believe in any law above national self-interest. They made the tempter their leader and gave him the power he asked for to carry out his plan. They made themselves his slaves and he led them to disaster.

In all the dark picture there has been just one bright spot. The German church rose up from its slumber and insignificance to become almost the sole source of resistance to the evil program of the dictator. The intellectuals (for the most part) and the universities succumbed and took their orders. The newspapers, the trade unions and the leaders of commerce fell into line and goose-stepped. But in the churches there was a considerable section who at length opened their eyes to see the evil program for what it was. It was too late to stop it. But it was not too late to protest, to resist, and to suffer. By their heroism these religious leaders of Germany, whatever their earlier faults, have earned title to respect. They indicate that the great tragedy of the twentieth century could not have happened had not Germany so largely lost her religion.

RELIGION IN THE POSTWAR WORLD

These historical facts show plainly that man has not outgrown the need of religion. Religion is still needed to

support the moral law which underlies the social structure and to provide a court of appeal from evils that appear in the legalized social structure to a higher law which is concerned equally with the good of all. *The lesson of history is that where religion is weak any crisis in a nation's history that puts a strain on the moral resources of its people is apt to end in moral breakdown and social chaos; and chaos ends in loss of freedom, in foreign conquest or local dictatorship.*

One does not need to be a prophet to foresee that America and all the other democracies will, in the near future, be faced by problems in which the moral conscience of the people will need all the support it can derive from religion. We have to guide the destinies of a new world organization without either developing a new imperialism or relapsing into isolationism. The British commonwealth must liquidate its imperialism. America must solve its race problem. The problem of mass unemployment has only been postponed by war; the solution has yet to be found. In our economy, wealth still tends to accumulate too much in the hands of the few while millions are "ill-fed, ill-housed, and ill-clothed."

These problems will try our souls. They call for wisdom guided by a strong national sense of justice, obligation, good will and respect for personality. The self-interest of individuals and of great economic and political pressure groups must be restrained. Can it be done if we lose the sense of a higher law above the individual's desire for his own success and happiness? Can it be done without an adequate religion?

Leaders of social movements for the improvement of the lot of the depressed classes have not sufficiently realized the importance of the moral element in politics.

They have put their trust in group self-interest and the power of the majority vote or the threat of mass revolution. They have not awakened to the fact that in a modern industrial society the depressed classes are no longer a majority. No more than one-third of our American people are "ill-fed, ill-housed and ill-clothed." It is the majority who profit from the cheap labor and bad conditions imposed on the minority. If each group votes only according to its self-interest that majority will continue to maintain this situation.

The middle class holds the balance of voting power and, from the purely economic standpoint, it is not in its interest to unite with the poor to rectify their injustices at the expense of the rich. If the injustices of the poor are to be rectified it must be done by appeal to the sense of justice of the middle class to vote for reform, even at some cost to themselves. If this is to be done we shall need all the support of religion in the appeal to the middle-class sense of justice. And we shall need the leadership of those whose political activities are inspired by religious ideals.

Communists, in attacking religion, are undermining their best source of support in their efforts on behalf of the dispossessed. Because the religious institutions of nineteenth-century Europe supported the traditional aristocratic and capitalistic conceptions of the state the Marxians attacked religion. And because of their materialistic philosophy they did not believe in the power of moral motives to institute reforms. So they concluded that the situation could not be remedied without force. They worked for the revolution. And they were met by the counterrevolution of fascism. They are now a hundred years behind the times. Revolution by force can

no longer remedy the wrongs of the poor, for the rich are possessed of all the powerful weapons and have the support of the great middle class. The "increasing misery of the proletariat" is a myth; and so is the theory of its increasing numbers. The day of popular revolutions is over for modern nations. Only fascist revolutions are now possible. The only hope for the common man lies in democracy. And the only hope *there* lies in a national sense of justice backed by religion.

ETHICS WITHOUT RELIGION

Those who contend that we ought to have outgrown religion usually support their position by saying that enlightened self-interest is enough if only it is sufficiently enlightened. There is no need, they argue, of any higher law to require of a man that he should be just, generous, courageous and honest in his dealings with his fellows. It is in his true interest to be so. Such conduct maintains an orderly society in which he can live securely and happily. It wins him that respect and friendship without which few can be successful and none happy. Above all, it maintains his own inner self-respect, which is vitally important, for no external pleasures and successes can compensate for the inner dissatisfaction a man feels if he is contemptible in his own esteem.

In answer to this we should point out that, so long as a man considers only his external worldly interests, apart from the inner demands of his own self-respect, it is often to his interest (in this narrow sense) to ignore the rights and welfare of others, especially when the great majority of his own associates, his own class or community, do the same. The easy way is always to go with the crowd. In a community of cheats honesty is not always the best pol-

icy. Further, if bad social situations are to be remedied someone must protest and take the consequences of scorn and hatred. The prophets of social justice are likely to be stoned. And martyrs are not produced by motives of external and worldly self-interest, however enlightened.

But what of the final argument for the ethics of self-interest — the need to maintain one's spiritual integrity, one's inner self-respect? The answer here is, first, that most people respect the sort of person they have been taught to respect. Their conscience does not rise above the common level. They therefore tolerate in themselves whatever actions they find generally condoned by those around them. "Others do it," they say, "so why shouldn't I?" The demands of conscience, or inner self-respect, will never raise a person above the common level around him unless he does a great deal of serious and self-critical thinking on moral issues. But few do this. And why should they if the result is only to develop a sensitive conscience that will stand in the way of their other desires? So most people are content to be as good, morally, as the next person. And it is easy for a man to persuade himself that he is as good as the next person when really he is not. Thus the moral standard tends gradually to fall instead of rise — unless people believe that it is fixed by an authority higher than their own self-interest and the opinions of those round about them.

Against this the objection is still urged that there are, in fact, many people who do not believe in God, but who nevertheless maintain fine characters and make many personal sacrifices for the common good. This is, of course, true. It may even be the case that, in a community where there is a general belief in God, the character of the few unbelievers is above that of the general level of

the believers. The unbeliever must be a person of intelligence and mental vigor to think his way to a view so vitally different from that of the great majority. Such a person readily absorbs the best in the moral tradition, with critical discrimination as to its real meaning. He desires the respect of the community and cultivates the virtues which win that respect. He feels keenly the inner need to maintain his own personal integrity and so is loyal to the truth as he sees it when the evidence seems to him to be against the commonly accepted religious beliefs. He may even sacrifice external, worldly interests for the inner satisfaction of maintaining the integrity and freedom of his own thought. He is to be honored for doing so. One of the great mistakes of religious people has been the persecution of such men. The term "atheist" should never be used with scorn or contempt. Most of those in our community to whom it is applicable are persons of good character and honest seekers of truth.

But the atheist's character is maintained by his conscience, supported by his inner self-respect. It would make him unhappy to do things that he has learned to regard as contemptible. But why does he regard it as contemptible to commit an injustice even when it is in his external and worldly interests to do so? Why does he regard it as fine and admirable to be just and generous, honest and courageous even to the point of personal self-sacrifice? It is because these ideals are the essential part of the moral tradition in which he has been trained — a tradition developed and preserved by the religion in which the general community believes. Why do the Nazi storm troopers not regard it as contemptible to kick a harmless Jew in the stomach? It is because the great group of Germans to which they belong has lost its be-

lief in the authority of the Christian moral tradition and replaced it by a creed of race superiority and brute force. Why have nominally Christian mobs sometimes done the same sort of thing? Because they have not thoroughly absorbed the finer part of the Christian tradition so as to incorporate it into their proper self-respect, or because they have allowed their temporary passion to drive them to do things of which they are subsequently ashamed.

There can be no doubt that these ideals of justice, generosity, courage and honesty have been developed and maintained by religion. Among primitive men religion supports the tribal moral code, which asserts that every tribesman has duties to his fellows, whether they are in accord with his own interests or not. Gradually this code is extended — to the visiting stranger, to friendly tribes, to all mankind, even to enemies. Tribal religions have supported the narrower moralities, but the prophets of religious progress have initiated and supported the expansion of the concept of duty against individual and group self-interest. They have based this obligation on the conception of a God who is source and support of the moral law and have argued that because God takes an interest in the welfare of other persons and other peoples so too should we.

It is difficult to see in what other way this broad universal conception of man's moral obligations can be logically maintained. Whether it can we shall inquire in our next chapter. For the present we simply note that historically it was religion that developed the concept of universal obligation and that religion still sustains it. Any other basis, even if one can be found, must for long be socially weak and precarious.

The study of ethics without religion leads then to these conclusions: (*a*) that a pursuit of one's external and worldly self-interest alone does not produce the kind of character society needs; (*b*) that the further development of character depends on a person's inner self-respect, demanding of him that he live up to an ideal set by his conscience; (*c*) that the ideals his conscience upholds are first shaped by the moral tradition he is taught in his youth and can be modified only by critical thinking; (*d*) that, historically, it is the critical thinking of religious teachers that has shaped our moral tradition and developed our ideals of universal justice and good will; (*e*) that when the religious standard is rejected people are easily diverted to standards set up by special groups in their own special interests, e.g., those of race, nation and class.

THE INTELLECTUAL PROBLEM

From the practical standpoint, then, it is evident that we have not outgrown the *need* of religion. But the question still presses: Is there any proof of the truth of religion? Are there any rational grounds for believing in a divine authority for the moral law? And how can we know what is the moral law to which it bears witness? Religions differ in their moral codes. And some of their doctrines are plainly false and superstitious. On others they contradict each other. Those who say we ought to have outgrown religion are usually thinking of the inadequacies and errors of our present religion — the conservative and often reactionary political tendencies of some religious institutions, the outworn creeds that have lost the respect of the majority of intelligent and edu-

moral law rests in something greater than himself or any priest or king or other human authority. The god of man's early religious beliefs is first and foremost the sustainer of the moral law, whatever else he may be. We also saw that the important function religion performs for society is, first, to uphold the fundamental moral law on which the social structure rests and, second, to offer authority for a higher moral law in the light of which the prophets and reformers can criticize the existing law of the land when it works badly. So let us begin with this simpler conception. Our question then will mean: Can we find any authority for the moral law higher than that of man? This will also involve the question: Can we know what the moral law really is? When we search for the origin of the moral law we shall discover that there is something within ourselves which demands of us that we concern ourselves disinterestedly with the good of others. And further inquiry will disclose that this "something" is God.

THE ETHICS OF SELF-INTEREST AND LOYALTY

In discussing the question whether self-interest is an adequate guide for the moral life we took notice of the assertion, made by critics of religion, that a man's own inner self-respect demands of him that he be just, generous and honest in his dealings with his fellows. We replied that this moral self-respect, or conscience, which demands of him that he consider the interests of others besides himself and which makes him feel contemptible if he does not, has been developed and shaped by a religious tradition. This raised the question whether conscience can be maintained at this high level without the influence of religion in the community.

It has already been pointed out that such an ideal cannot be based on self-interest at the level of external and worldly interests. One person's worldly interests clash with another's. The private interests of individuals and groups are not always consistent with the general public interest. If we argue, "You must be just to others or you cannot expect them to be just to you," the answer comes too easily, "I don't believe they will always be just to me, so I can't afford to be always just to them." If any man is ashamed to give such an answer it must be because he believes in an ideal of conduct that is above self-interest. In brief, the moral ideal requires that an individual should sometimes sacrifice his own interests for the good of the community, and it is logically impossible to base an appeal for self-sacrifice on self-interest.

In practice such appeals are commonly based, not on self-interest, but on a motive that is often much more powerful and always much more admired — that of loyalty to the group, to friends or family, comrades or country. Man is a social animal and deep-rooted social tendencies attach him to the social groups to which he belongs. Every normal person is ashamed not to be loyal. Here, certainly, is one of the reasons why a certain concern for the good of others forms part of the ideal of conduct demanded of us by our inner self-respect.

But loyalties are always narrow. They not only *attach* us to groups; they also *divide* us into groups. They hold us to one group and set us against others. If there is a loyalty toward the human race as a whole it is inevitably weak beside the loyalties to the narrower groups which enter so much more directly and deeply into our lives. So if it were simply our loyalties that produced in us the moral ideal, that ideal would never carry us beyond fam-

ily and tribal morality. But this is merely the sort of morality that people tend to revert to when they lose their religion. They become, at best, good friends, good comrades, good Americans—or good Nazis. At this level people feel it contemptible to injure or betray the group. But they must rise to a higher level if they are to feel that it is contemptible, for some relatively small benefit to themselves or their own group, to injure or betray an outsider.

THE WILL TO THE GREATEST GOOD

Neither self-interest nor loyalty, then, can form an adequate basis for an ethic that asserts the universal and equal rights of all. Yet such an ethic has won almost universal approval in the Golden Rule taught by both Christ and Confucius and in such principles as the utilitarian slogan of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." On what can this approval be based? Is there, in human nature itself, some *general* principle of good will to all mankind? If so, is it strong enough to account for the fact that these high ethical ideals have come to be almost everywhere endorsed, even though, in practice, we fall far short of them?

Reflection on this question shows that there is such a principle. There is something within us which *demand*s of us that we concern ourselves disinterestedly with the good of others besides ourselves. It makes itself felt when we reflect, when we sit down in a cool hour and think about the pleasures and pains, joys and sorrows, of other human beings—or indeed of any living creatures. It also responds impulsively when we see another's pleasure or pain. We tend *naturally* to be glad that others are glad and sad that others are sad. This tendency is a part

of human nature. It is so distinctive of human nature that we say of those who manifest it strongly that they are "humane." We remark of such a person that "he is very human." We call the opposite qualities "inhuman."

We may call this "the general tendency to seek the good," because it is not specially concerned with the good of any particular person, either one's self or friend. Nor is it specially concerned with any particular kind of good. It is just that whatever appeals to us as good is something that we naturally wish should exist, apart from any question as to whose good it is or what may be its further consequences. Because it has no special interest or bias we say it is "disinterested."

When we go on to pay attention to distinctions of *whose* good, or further consequences, this, of course, may change our wish. The small good that brings very bad consequences we view as evil "as a whole"; we then wish that, as a whole, it should not exist; and we tend to act accordingly. The question of whose good may also affect our action. We form special habits of desiring the good of some people, especially our own self, more strongly than that of others. This habit may make the wish for the *lesser* good of self or friend stronger than the wish for the *greater* good of some other person, where the wish for the good has not been strengthened by the growth of habit. This choice of the lesser good we often call "evil." But it is not really a wish to produce evil. It is merely that the wish for a certain good has acquired extra strength through habit and thus overrides the wish for the other good.

This strength of habit often leads to choice of the lesser good even for one's self. We may reflectively recognize

a certain good as the greater; but when the moment for action comes old habits assert themselves and we reach for the good that is near and familiar. Again, this choice of the lesser good we may reflectively call "evil." But it was not due to a wish for evil — for sorrow, pain or disappointment. It was due to a habit-strengthened wish for a certain minor good. Animal appetites and natural emotional tendencies or "instincts" may similarly upset our more deliberate choices of the greater good.

What looks much more like an actual wish to produce evil for its own sake occurs in anger. But anger is a secondary reaction. We have wished for certain goods and found our efforts to produce them interfered with. This arouses a wish to do something to the source of interference so that it can no longer interfere; and this wish is commonly reinforced by the emotional feeling we call anger. Emotion makes us blind; it concentrates attention on a single wish so that we don't think of other consequences. If the infliction of pain, or even death, upon the person interfering with our other wishes appears as the means to prevent his interference, then we tend to wish that pain or death upon him. And if emotion sufficiently blinds us to the consequences we may try to carry it out. If a person very frequently interferes with our desires we may so get the habit of wishing pain or destruction to prevent him that we begin to think of any evil to him as a good to ourselves. This is the attitude we call hatred. But it is still true that anger and hatred are secondary reactions. The wishing of evil upon the other person is due to a tendency first established as a means to a certain further good for the self or friends or friendly group. It may be a wish for a lesser good, but

it is one that is reinforced by habit or natural emotional impulses.

THE SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG

In all these cases, therefore, we see that the human wish is a wish for a good. And normally, of course, we wish for the greatest possible good. But acquired habits, animal appetites, and instinctive, emotional impulses reinforce certain wishes and often lead us to pursue the lesser good. For the most part these habits and other impulses lead us to choose our own private good. And when they do so at the cost of the greater good of others we call this "selfishness" and say it is wrong.

Now here is a very familiar fact that is truly remarkable. But it is so familiar we do not realize how remarkable it is. It is really extraordinary that we should ever think it wrong to do anything so natural as to pursue our strongest wishes. But we do. If ever we sit down and coolly consider the fact that we chose the lesser of two possible goods we feel that there was something wrong about that choice. It is the same if we have chosen a good at the cost of an evil that outweighs it. This would be easily intelligible if we felt this way only when the greater good lost, or the greater evil incurred, is our own. But we tend to feel that it is wrong also to pursue our own lesser good at the cost of losing some greater good (or incurring some greater evil) for another person.

We feel this most strongly when it is the good of some friend or member of our own social group that we have thus neglected for our own lesser good. There are two reasons for this, both rooted in habit. In the first place

we have learned (or acquired the habit) from the community to think of such actions as wrong. Second, the wish to produce the good of friends and neighbors is always reinforced by habit, so that the conflicting nature of our action is more strongly impressed upon us.

But we cannot explain the whole sense of wrong as due to the teaching of the community. For if the community (e.g., a Nazi community) should say that to seek a benefit for one's self at the cost of a definitely greater injury to another person is all right in certain special cases (e.g., if the other person is a Jew), then it is possible for a member of that (Nazi) community to see that in this case *his community is wrong*. And he *will* see this if only he will think hard enough and without special prejudice.

In the early stages of moral development each social group tended to confine its sense of obligation to its own members, because their own habits and the comments of those around them drew their attention to wrongs done to their own people, but not to others. Also, emotional prejudices, springing from fear and anger, tended to blind them in the case of wrongs done to members of another group. But some individuals did some hard and unprejudiced thinking on these questions and came to feel that it is also wrong, for the sake of some relatively small personal benefit, to bring injury on a stranger. When these thinkers first expressed this view they were met with opposition and derision, for people do not like to have their habits interfered with or to have obligations thrust upon them. But the thinkers persisted and made other people think. And when the others *thought* enough about it they began to feel the same way. So eventually the stranger was accorded his rights. And

gradually man came to recognize that what is *really* right is always to do the best for all concerned.

It was a lesson human beings did not learn willingly, for it is so much against man's habits and impulses which tend to pursue our own good first. Even when people came to recognize the principle as right they still failed to live up to it, and made all sorts of excuses for exceptions to the rule. For habits and traditions are very strong. But almost everywhere now it is recognized by those who think, and think without prejudice, on questions of right and wrong, that we ought to do in every case what seems best for all concerned.

This result has come about by thoughtful analysis of our sense of right and wrong, as we feel it. And thoughtful analysis could not have produced this general conclusion if it were not that there is *something in our nature which demands of us that we seek the good of others equally with our own*. It is not merely that we wish for the good of the other person. We do that, but usually we wish more strongly for our own. It is not merely that we wish for the greatest good. We do that, too; but we also often wish more strongly for some lesser good — for ourselves or our own group. It is rather that there is an "ought," a "sense of obligation," attached to the idea of the greatest good. The will to realize it has a unique sort of authority. If, by force of habit or impulse, we override it for the sake of some lesser good, it has the power of impressing upon us, in subsequent reflection, that we did wrong. We can refuse to reflect and blindly follow habit, tradition and personal preference. We can shake off the sense of wrong by ceasing to reflect. But we cannot *think* about questions of good and evil, right and wrong, without finding that the will to the greatest good

of all concerned tends to break through our selfishness and the limitations established by group tradition. It breaks through and asserts its authority. All that conflicts with it is wrong.

THE WILL THAT IS FIRST AND LAST

Our analysis has shown that this sense of an "ought" is attached to the will to the greatest good. This will, with its "ought," is a part of the self. It may not be as strong as the wishes that have acquired the force of habit or are backed by native impulse and emotion; but in reflective thought it asserts its peculiar authority. Whatever impulse or desire is out of harmony with it, it brands as "wrong." To be wrong is to miss the goal at which one aims, or to be out of harmony with an acknowledged standard. So the choice of the lesser good is said to be out of harmony with some standard or to miss its real aim, even if it obtains that lesser good. The will to the greatest good asserts itself as right. And it asserts that the *real* aim of the self in every act of will is also the greatest good, but that in pursuing this lesser good (through force of habit or natural impulse) it is off its course, missing its mark. The assertion is that the real aim, the fundamental purpose, of every self is to produce the greatest good, whether that be for itself or for some other.

This means that any pursuit of any particular good is simply a part of a larger aim, a means to an end. The ultimate end is always the greatest possible good. But this ultimate end is commonly forgotten in attention to the means. The means is itself a good; and having found it good one may pursue it for its own sake and in ways that defeat the end. Thus, for example, a man desires health.

For his health he decides to take exercise. He finds the exercise good and takes too much, impairing his health. From the standpoint of health he has done wrong; he has missed the mark. Similarly, the *sufficiently reflective* moral conscience asserts that our ultimate goal is to produce the greatest possible good. We find that possession of money is a means to much good. We enjoy and take pride in possession of it and pursue the possession of money at the cost of some greater good to some other person. In reflection we discover that this is wrong. It has missed the mark, the true end, the ultimate goal.

Now the will to the end is not merely the last act of will in the series of efforts that work toward a goal. It is also the first. And it remains as the set, directing purpose, in the background of consciousness, all the way through. So the assertion that our ultimate goal is the production of the greatest possible good means that the will to the greatest good is not merely the final form, the highest development, of the moral life; it is also its fundamental beginning.

This means that in the simplest beginning of human consciousness, will takes the form of an effort to produce good, more good, always greater and greater good. In this effort it forms specific habits which in general serve its purpose and add to its power to pursue further good. It acquires knowledge of many different kinds of good and different means to good. It cannot keep all these in mind at once, nor can it keep its ultimate goal ever clearly before it. But in each situation it responds to what it feels or anticipates as good, seeking to maintain and expand it. Gradually it develops the capacity of analyzing a situation and distinguishing alternative possibilities of action. More or less accurately it foresees the

end of each action and makes its choice according to which promises the greater good. Thus it modifies its habits and develops new ones.

For the first few years of a human life there is no awareness of any goods other than its own immediate sensory pleasures and natural satisfactions. These are the goods it pursues; and it forms a strong set of habits of pursuing such goods without much analysis of alternative possibilities. But gradually the child becomes aware of other selves as also having pleasures and pains, satisfactions and dissatisfactions. When the child becomes aware of these he spontaneously seeks to produce these goods too—goods he does not himself feel. As soon as a mother can make the child understand that she too enjoys eating candy the child will manifest a desire to put candy into her mouth, and will show much pleasure in doing what he has come to understand brings pleasure to the other person. This means that as soon as the child learns that he *can* create pleasure in another person's experience he spontaneously *wants* to do so. He is not indirectly seeking his own pleasure. He gets pleasure out of doing it only because he *first* has the desire to do it—to create a good he does not himself immediately experience. Gradually he then forms habits of pursuing this other sort of good besides his own.

But now arise new possibilities of conflicts between his desires. He desires the good of other people and of himself. He has a well established set of habits of seeking his own goods, i.e., his own pleasures and satisfactions. These often conflict with what he sees to be the greater good of other persons. At first, habit is usually dominant. But occasionally he reflects on such choices and then he begins to feel something vaguely wrong

about them. The impulse to pursue his own good was stronger at the time of action because it was reinforced by habit. It was the familiar, easy and assured line of action. But in reflection the good obtained appears definitely smaller compared to the good lost or the evil produced—for the other person. The choice of the lesser good appears somehow to have missed his real aim.

At length he realizes that he now wishes, and has always wished, to produce the greater good. In similar instances in the past, when he has neglected or destroyed the greater good, or produced an evil overbalancing the good, he has been told such acts are "naughty" or "wrong." He now has a new experience to attach to that word. It has acquired new meaning. On a subsequent occasion he remembers how such actions appeared in later reflection. He controls the habitual impulse and pursues the greater good. Gradually such choices become habitual and easy. He has become socially adapted. He has formed a good character. He has become a well integrated personality because he has brought his major habits into harmony with that will to the greatest good which is first and last, the beginning and the end of his volitional life.

MORAL EFFORT AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY

We can see now where all those attempts to trace moral conduct to enlightened self-interest are wrong. They interpret human will as originally and essentially an effort to obtain something seen as "good-for-me." In reality, *will is originally and essentially neutral as between the self in which it occurs and other selves.* It is simply a response to the quality of value that enters into the life of feeling. It prefers pleasure to pain, beauty to ugliness,

joy to sorrow. We lump all these together when we say it prefers good to evil. It seeks ever the greatest good within the horizon of its feeling and thought.

At first the only goods within that horizon are those of its own self, as immediately felt. At this stage the will never hesitates. It goes for the greatest, the one that is most strongly felt. It avoids the felt evils or pains. Later the individual develops the capacity to anticipate future goods; and now some hesitation arises. It has formed the habit of paying attention to what is present. When the future good appears greater than the present some effort is required to break through this habit and pay attention to the more distant goal. But it learns to do this and directs its behavior accordingly. At length the individual develops the capacity to recognize the existence of other selves and imaginatively to enter into their experience and see that they too have pleasures and pains, joys and sorrows. Here is a new cause of hesitation. The habit of paying attention to the self's own goods conflicts with the tendency to pursue the greatest good when that is the good of some other self. It requires some effort of will to break through the habit, pay attention to the good of others, and act accordingly. But when the will makes that effort it is true to its own essential nature. When it fails it is the slave of habit.

Now we must not make the mistake of setting up a complete distinction between habit and will. A habitual action can, in some circumstances, be carried out automatically and unconsciously. In so far as this is the case the action is not willed. It is involuntary. But so long as we are aware of our goal and of what we are doing our actions are willed (i.e., voluntary), however familiar and habitual. Every wish or want is an act of will,

even the wishes or wants of our natural appetites. A conflict between two desires is a conflict of will. Will is not an indivisible unit, except in its simplest possible form where there is no awareness of alternatives. So every habit is simply a specialized form of will, become familiar, easy, strong and ready through frequent practice. A habit is the development of a capacity to perform certain voluntary actions with ease and power and with little attention. The growth of habits adds to our capacity to perform complex actions and to deal with complex situations with accuracy and assurance. It frees attention to look further afield and analyze the unfamiliar.

It is now a generally recognized conception of modern psychology that an individual personality is simply an organized bundle of habits. An individual mind is a more or less well integrated set of habitual tendencies to attend to this; that and the other thing—a set of habits of thought and action. But each habitual act, as we have seen, is an act of will; and each habit is thus a specialized form of volitional tendency, a special development of will. Every act of will is a pursuit of some good; and a habit is a special set, or tendency, of will to pursue certain particular goods as opportunity offers. The habit thus arises out of the general tendency of will to pursue the good—and the greatest good within its horizon. Thus the *individuality* or individual personality is a special set of volitional tendencies (forms of will) developed out of a general volitional tendency (a general will) to pursue the greatest possible good. And if the individual is to be a well integrated (or harmonious) personality his habits must be kept in harmony with each other and with the general will to the greatest good.

MIND, LIFE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

The individual mind, therefore, is a growth of special volitional tendencies that grow out of the general will to the good. But whence comes the general will to the good? The answer is that it is in every living thing that feels pleasure or pain, comfort or discomfort, or any other form of good or evil. It is that which struggles and strives in everything that struggles and strives; and it strives to increase the good in the experience of that creature. But in each creature its outlook, or knowledge, is limited to that of the creature. It is an active striving after the good, but with a finite or limited outlook.

It is this feeling and striving that distinguish the living from the nonliving. Even single-celled organisms like the amoeba give evidence of it. The consciousness that we enjoy is the unification of a mass of feelings, centered in the activity of the cells of the cortex of the brain. These feelings are held together by the act of attention. When we become sufficiently inattentive we become unconscious. The spotlight of attention is the height of consciousness, leaving a mass of vague feeling in the background that is marginally conscious, subconscious, and even unconscious. For the unconscious processes of life are not devoid of feeling and striving. A mass of evidence from abnormal psychology proves that.

Consciousness is a certain selected mass of present feeling of the living organism, pulled together and retained for a brief space of time. It enables us to distinguish the passage of time in the transition of feelings; and thus we become aware of the distinction of past and future. This makes recognition possible when the same kind of feel-

ing recurs. And it makes learning possible as we discern the connection of different felt objects, one following another. This act of attention which pulls feelings together creates consciousness. Without it feeling and striving still exist, but unconsciously, because they are disconnected and momentary. We know that this is so because abnormal psychology has discovered an abundance of cases where people have later become conscious of past feelings and strivings of which they were not conscious at the time they occurred.

It may seem, at first, like a contradiction in terms to speak of "unconscious feelings." But a little reflection shows that consciousness requires much more than the existence of a present feeling. To be conscious we must also be able to hold that feeling in immediate memory when it has passed, connect it with the new present feeling, and anticipate some further feeling. Consciousness is a linking up of feelings into a connected whole which constitutes intelligible experience. This makes memory possible; and habits linked by memory constitute personality.

Abnormal psychology, however, shows us that, in any individual, this linking may be very incomplete. In the one individual there may be a set of linked feelings that are separate from the main body and constitute a secondary consciousness, a repressed personality. This is abnormal. But the normal consciousness certainly shuts out a mass of feelings, especially when it is most highly attentive. And some of these certainly seem to function as though they were interlinked in secondary conscious association. So it is evident that our nightly sleep and other gaps in normal consciousness do not indicate complete absence of feeling, or even complete cessation of

all forms of secondary consciousness. We lose the connections whereby we remember or become aware of them. That is all.

The evidence, then, is fairly conclusive that will (i.e., feeling and striving) is continuous throughout life, present in every cell of a living organism, though it is not always gathered together in that act of attentive consciousness whereby the individual strives to direct the behavior of his organism as a whole. And this will, as we have seen, is always a striving after what is felt or anticipated as good.

The general will to the good can therefore be traced back to the beginnings of life. It was the activity that made the difference between the animate and inanimate in the first bit of living substance on earth. That activity was a response to a feeling of something good. It was a striving to maintain and increase that good. In course of time this striving built up what we call a living cell; and that cell grew and multiplied itself into many distinct cells. Thus the ongoing activity of the initial general will to the good developed special set forms (or habits) in each different organism, enhancing their powers and adapting them to a particular environment and mode of life. It developed the power of gathering up the multiple feelings of a cell into the beginnings of attentive consciousness, and so distinguished between before and after, and formed the capacity to learn by experience. In its special set forms it developed colonies of cells and organized these into a multicellular organism. It developed the organization of the attentive consciousness into an intelligent human mind, capable of thinking of the good of other selves.

Up to this point the outlook of this feeling-striving

process, as present in each organism, had been limited to the good of that organism. But now it became aware of a vast range of other goods in the lives of other organisms. And it then showed its true nature, as a will to the *greatest* good, by reaching out to produce the greatest good on the whole, even though not the greatest good of the particular person through which it worked. Then it found itself sometimes in conflict with the particular, specialized forms of will, directed toward particular, special goods of the individual, which it had developed in the past.

As the attentive consciousness of the individual pulled together its specialized habits to direct the activity of the self as a whole toward its own greatest good it found its familiar habits in conflict with a new form of desire within itself, a desire for the good of some other person. But this desire was new only in that it was a desire for the good of another self. It was old—the very oldest form of desire—in that it was desire for the greatest good. And as the oldest form of will, the very source of all the others, it asserted its authority. The attentive consciousness could not pull itself together into a single united will by subjecting this original and ultimate form of will to the other forms that had been developed as its instruments.

The strength of the special habits often was enough to flout this new aim of the old, original form of will. But they could not integrate it in subjection to themselves. If they flouted it the self remained divided against itself, and pained, when it reflected, by a sense of something wrong. So the effort at reintegration must be made, the effort of attentive consciousness to subject the special habits to the will to the greatest good. It was an effort

at self-integration that had to be made by the self as a whole. It was hard; and it had to be made often. With practice it grew easier. It can grow almost habitual. But what self succeeds in always maintaining that integration perfectly?

GOD AS FOUND WITHIN

This, in brief, is the story of life on earth. It finds the origin of life in an act of will, responding to a feeling of something good and seeking to produce more good. But it does not assume that that original act of will was aware of the end from the beginning. It does not assume a consciousness of any ultimate goal toward which it is working. The story merely takes life as it is found. Life is seen as a process striving, in spite of difficulties, to produce all the good it can, making mistakes, getting at cross purposes with itself and producing evil, but still striving to correct its errors and drive ever to produce more and greater good.

Obviously, the story thus far is incomplete. We want to know more about that original act of will that has been expanding and multiplying itself ever since: in all the amazing forms of life and the still more amazing history of man. Could that act of will be the first? What was it that produced it? Is it only in man and the animals that a multiplicity of feeling-striving processes (or acts of will) ever are integrated by an act of attention to form consciousness? How is this activity of feeling, or will, related to the physical body?

These are questions to be examined later. But even with the material we have gathered thus far we can answer the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter. We saw that, for religion, God is, above all, the

source of the moral law. We asked: Can we know of any authority for the moral law higher than that of man? Can we know what the moral law really is? Now we see the answers. The moral law is that every person should at all times seek to do the greatest possible good for all concerned. It is the Golden Rule which religion long has taught us. And the authority for it is so much above any man or body of men that it is the fundamental source of all earthly life, the will that animates all that breathes, that is active still in every man. And with this will that seeks in and through each of us the good of all we must make our peace and live in harmony or there can be no peace or harmony in our souls.

If this will to the greatest good, which is the source and ultimate guide of our lives, our Alpha and Omega, is rightly called "God," then we see God face to face. We know him more intimately than we know any other person. For we only look on the external face of another man; we merely guess at the life within him. But we look upon the actual will of God in operation (his inner soul) as we do upon our own. We see the essential nature of his will more clearly and simply than we do the complex nature of our own. For God is in us. He is a part of us. We are products of his activity, outgrowths of his life. And he is active still within us, guiding us, admonishing us, using us, cheering us with the sense of inner peace and strength when we are in harmony with him.

This is exactly the sort of knowledge of God that our greatest religious teachers have declared we have. "Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God" (Matt. 5:8). "For it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:13).

"In him we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28). "In him was life; and the life was the light of men . . . which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" (John 1:4, 9).

This is the knowledge of God that we have by immediate acquaintance. It should be enough to make us recognize the nature and authority of the moral law. But we want to know more about God than this. Indeed many will hesitate to use the name "God" for something, however important, that we find within ourselves, unless we can show that it is more than just in ourselves. But other facts about God must depend on inference. They cannot be given in immediate experience as are the will to the greatest good and the sense of obligation or authority attaching to it: God as found within us. We must infer the rest from nature and history and the details of personal experience. But all our knowledge is like that—even our knowledge of the physical world and other persons. Something is given in immediate experience and the rest is inferred from its relation to other data of experience.

In our study thus far we have already inferred that what we find within ourselves as a will to the greatest good is the fundamental form of will from which our whole personality has developed, and that it is continuous with the first act of will, which was the dawn of life on earth. If we call this will "God" then we can say already that God is creative, personal, good, immanent in man, and the source of the moral law which bids us love our neighbors as ourselves. But we cannot be content with this. We want to know more of God's relation to us and to the world, of what he has done in history and of the hopes he holds out to us for the future.

But "God is a Spirit." If this is so then our further knowledge of him must come through a study of spirit where we know it best. This, if there really is any such thing at all, should be in the life of man. So we pass to our next question: Has man a soul?

Has Man a Soul?

DEFINITIONS

ONCE AGAIN we had better begin by defining our terms, for the term "soul" has been used sometimes for the animal life, sometimes for the immortal element in man, sometimes for the higher mental, moral and aesthetic capacities, whether believed to be immortal or not. We shall use the term here for that part of man's life and mind which may be believed to survive the death of the body. The terms "spirit" and "spiritual" we shall use for all the life and mind of man which is above the level of the other animals, whether this is all immortal or not. Thus we can distinguish sharply between man's animal and spiritual tendencies. The term "life" will be used to refer to all activities or processes other than the merely physical, whether conscious or not. We shall see reason to believe that all these processes or activities are of the nature of feeling and striving, even when unconscious. Thus all "life" is also "mental." There is no distinction between life and mind. But we shall use the terms "mind" and "mental" to refer more particularly to those processes or activities which normally *can* be conscious, though they may become unconscious.

THE ORIGIN OF FEELING

If the distinctive feature of life is the feeling-striving process we call "will," then whence did it come? Some

scientists have speculated that it has been produced in some mysterious way by some minute material body. Within the slimy substance, floating in the shallows of the warm seas when the earth's crust was new, the ultra-violet rays of the sun synthesized many new and complex chemicals. Somewhere a new synthesis or mixture of these clung together in a new sort of lump or extra-large molecule which began to act in an extraordinary way. It ingested, digested and egested other chemicals. It built itself up. It multiplied its own kind by division, and these new individuals built up colonies of cells and eventually developed multicellular organisms. Somewhere in the course of this process, perhaps at the very beginning, some of these chemical processes produced feelings. The processes that tended to build up the organisms felt good; those that disintegrated it felt bad. Along with feeling came striving—striving to maintain the good feelings and be rid of the bad. Thus the striving of the organism tended to maintain and expand its life. At length the feelings developed consciousness and the conscious struggle for existence and expansion of power began.

This theory, of course, implies the ethic of self-interest. The striving process is produced by the organism and always strives to build it up and maintain it. It strives for the good of another only as a means to its own good. The falsity of this ethical conclusion immediately suggests the falsity of the whole theory.

But there are other objections to it besides this. If feeling and striving were not present from the beginning, then it is most extraordinary that the early forms of living thing should behave in such a highly purposive-looking manner as they do. To meet this objection

many advocates of this theory accept the view that these factors must have been present and operative from the beginning of life. In this form the theory is more plausible. But it is still faced with the objection that it supposes that a world in which there was nothing but the push and pull of bits of lifeless matter could produce something so utterly different as feeling, with all its wealth of qualities—color, sound, pain, pleasure and all the rest.

The difficulty of believing that matter produces feeling becomes still greater when we inquire from the physicist what matter is. He tells us that it is composed of units of electrical energy organized into atoms. Each atom consists of one or more units of positive electricity ("protons") surrounded by one or more units of negative electricity ("electrons"); perhaps also some neutral units ("neutrons"). At the center there is a compact mass composed of protons (if more than one) and neutrons (if any). Around this revolve the electrons, like the planets in a miniature solar system, and relatively just as far away from the center. So most of the atom is empty space. The various parts do not touch each other, nor do they touch the parts of other atoms. The most solid-looking piece of matter is chiefly empty space, the units of energy pulling and pushing each other across distances relatively enormous. This apparent action at a distance, in the structure of a piece of matter, is a mystery, as is the apparent action at a distance we call gravitation, which holds our solar system together.

Now a little thought soon shows that it cannot be these separated units of electricity themselves that possess feeling. How could the feelings of a multitude of such sep-

arate units be combined into a single perception except by the activity of some unifying agent beyond them? Further, how could a set of such isolated feelings be combined into the unity of consciousness? If our feeling were located in the electrons and protons it would have to consist of a multitude of separate, shifting spots.

THE REALITY OF SPACE

The reason for the persistent effort of materialistic speculation to depict the units of physical energy as the locus of feeling is that materialism has always thought of matter as *the only reality* and has defined matter as that which occupies space. And these units of energy are all that physics can find as occupying space. So they are regarded as the only reality; and therefore they must be the locus of feeling and consciousness.

But this conclusion misses the significance of what modern physics has to teach us. It is no longer possible to regard the ultimate units of physical reality as bits of solid stuff moving around in empty space. They are units of energy, not bits of stuff. Energy is motion, activity. Careful physicists tend to describe their ultimate units simply as "operations," which have to be defined in terms of the operations we perform in measuring them. Physics knows nothing more about them than how they change position relative to each other. Chemistry and physiology can go on to describe how the operations physics describes are correlated with the sensations we feel. That is all we know from these sciences.

But what is the space in which these physical operations occur? Is it nothing? Then these operations are connected by nothing, for there is nothing but space be-

tween them. Obviously, space itself must be *something*, a reality of some sort. It is then a reality that is everywhere. In it occur all the operations that make up the physical world, and all the feelings, strivings and other activities that make up our minds.

This gives us a hint to answer another question. What is it that operates? There can be only one answer that avoids sheer invention of some purely imaginative entity or stuff. It is space. Space itself, the reality that is everywhere, is active in the form of that great system of inter-related operations which we call the energy system of the physical world. That would explain the mystery of action at a distance, the law of gravitation and the cohesion of the atom.

THE RELATION OF BODY AND MIND

If space is a *reality* (not just nothing) it would help us, too, to explain the mystery of feeling and its relation to the physical processes of the nervous system. Colors, sounds, and other qualities such as warmth and pain occur in space. Probably all space has *some* quality and the qualities change according to the physical operations in each particular space. The physical operations — e.g., electrons and protons — are events in space that set up changing tensions across the intervening space that holds them together. And with these changing tensions there are correlated changes in the quality present in that space. Thus, when a nerve is stimulated and a chemical change takes place in a certain part of the brain, this is correlated with a change of the quality present there.

But what is the function of these qualities in the whole scheme of things? Surely they have some part to play; surely the colors and sounds, pleasures and pains, have

some effect upon our behavior! Yet physics and chemistry can find no way in which they do affect physical processes. There is much about the chemistry of living cells that is not known. But all physicochemical processes, so far as they are understood, seem to operate without any effect upon them other than the effect they have on each other. Certainly it is hard to see how qualities like blue and red could push a molecule around or cause it to break up.

But here the conception of space as the agent that operates in all physical activity again comes to our rescue. Space must also be the agent that operates in all mental activities — in seeing red and blue, hearing sound, feeling pain, liking this, disliking that, striving to change this or that. If so we can understand how, when a new quality appears in a certain space in the brain (its appearance being due to a new nerve stimulus) and the mental act in that space changes from liking the former quality to disliking the new one, this change of mental activity, being really an activity of space itself, may affect the physical activity of the same space. It need not increase or decrease the total physical energy. It need not create a new electron or proton, nor destroy any, in order to do this. It may merely facilitate the process of chemical synthesis, or the release of energy from some molecule. It would simply be that the change from feelings of appetition to feelings of aversion, or vice versa, in a certain brain space has an effect upon the other (i.e., the physical) operations in that space. For both are operations of the same reality — the same space. This gives a very simple answer to the problem of the relation of body and mind.

THE STRUCTURE OF A MIND

This conception — that space, the omnipresent reality, is what operates in our mental activity — gives us a very workable conception of mind. It is a conception perfectly in harmony with our best psychological knowledge. We should not say that space is mind, merely because it performs mental activity. And it would be just as wrong to say that space is matter, merely because another set of its activities constitutes the physical world. A physical thing (an atom or a stone) is a particular, interrelated set of physical activities. Similarly, a mind is a particular, interrelated set of mental activities. The connection between the physical activities is what we call physical causation. The connection between the mental activities is memory and purpose.

But neither mind nor matter is a distinct substance or stuff. The physical universe and the whole historic course of life and mind are simply two distinctive sets of activity of the one omnipresent reality. Each set of activities has its own kind of inner relationship; one is the physical-causal; the other is that of memory-purpose. And the two sets of activity have their effect upon each other. For the physical activity presents qualities which the mental feels, likes or dislikes, and strives to change or increase or maintain. This response of liking and disliking, feeling and striving, then has its effect upon the course of physical events in the place where it occurs, e.g., in a human brain. A material thing is an organized system of physical activities of space. A life or mind is an organized system of mental activities of space.

Now consider more carefully the structure of a human mind. It is an organization of feelings-striving activities,

or acts of will. And these acts are not actions of any physical thing, nor of any particular local thing, but of the omnipresent reality. This reality we know immediately in its character of extension, or space. But we now discover it to be full of all sorts of other amazing potentialities.

The mental act consists in purposively attending to something. The objects attended to can be distinguished as having various colors and other sensory qualities, various shapes and sizes, motion and resistance. These features we classify together as the characteristics of physical objects. But we can also attend to our own mental activities; and we distinguish these as feeling, striving, perceiving, thinking, liking, disliking, etc.

The liking and disliking involve attention to a peculiar set of qualities of a kind we have not yet mentioned. They may be classified together as *values* and include the unique element felt in pleasure, pain, joy, sorrow, beauty, ugliness and every other sort of good and bad. We are at first inclined to regard the value-quality as depending entirely upon the nature of the object; e.g., the color of the rose is beautiful and its smell pleasant. But a more careful examination shows that the value-quality felt depends upon our own mental activity. The same color seen in a connection that gives it another meaning may appear ugly; the same smell on another occasion may be unpleasantly strong for us. Further, the value-qualities are often directly associated with our mental activities. We enjoy doing what interests us. If we have set our heart upon a certain goal we enjoy doing the things that seem to bring it nearer. In fact we can lay down a general rule that value-quality tends to be felt when our purposive activity (or that of a sense organ) is working

harmoniously and successfully toward its goals; disvalue is felt in frustration and failure.

It is not necessary that the goal should be explicitly in mind in order to affect our value experience and thus affect behavior. Ordinarily we tend to forget the distant goal while we pay attention to the present means that has been seen as a step towards it. Our will can become set on one of these means as a subsidiary goal; and we can then enjoy working towards this subsidiary goal, quite forgetting its ultimate purpose. Often we pursue it too far, to the injury of our ultimate purpose; and then we experience the unpleasantness or bitterness of frustration. This fact, that an act of will that is forgotten can still affect our value experience, making the activity feel enjoyable and satisfying or otherwise, shows that when an act of will is forgotten *it does not necessarily cease to exist*. It does not have to be conscious. Once established it can remain as an unconscious *set* of the mind. It then vaguely affects our value experience without our quite knowing what makes us happy or sad.

A human mind, therefore, consists of a complex organization of forms of will, set upon certain goals, not all of which are conscious at any one time. Indeed, only a small part of mind is conscious. The rest consists of set forms, operations of the omnipresent reality (or space) that have, as it were, taken their stand, become set, and so affect the value experience of that mind even when it is not conscious of them. If it does become conscious of them it is aware of them as wants or desires, set upon certain goals. But consciousness involves an act of attention which links up a selected group of feelings, strivings and set tendencies, giving some a special prominence and leaving others in the background. This at-

tention, giving a special prominence to some forms of will over others, brings about changes in the effect of the mental operations of the omnipresent reality (space) upon its physical operations in the same area, i.e., changes in the brain, and thus in bodily behavior.

But we can see now why we are not always conscious. The various set forms of will are so many special habits. So long as they remain the same the brain activity remains the same. Then occurs a new mental act of attention to the good by one of these forms of will, with liking or disliking of a certain object so as to want it changed. This effects a special new set of brain activity. But the nerve cells are fit for these special changes of activity only when they are freshly charged with potential energy and free from fatigue products. If mental activity tries to drive them when they are fatigued it experiences weariness, headache and frustration. So mental activity has formed the habit of giving the brain periodic rest. It becomes inattentive, inactive, unconscious; i.e., it goes to sleep. Similarly mental activity ceases immediately to disturb the brain when the brain is badly jarred, attacked by noxious drugs, or if the blood supply fails. It is the well established set, or habit, of the mind, perhaps inherited from its past ancestry, in such circumstances to become inactive, to relapse into unconsciousness. Thus the brain is given a chance to recover.

WHAT SURVIVES DEATH?

What happens to the mind if the brain never recovers, if it and the body disintegrate? For answer we have no clear and certain evidence. But, unless our whole interpretation of the facts is wrong, the mind need not cease to exist. If the mental activity is an operation of the

omnipresent reality, then a set form of will is a set form of that reality. And a human mind is an integrated organization of such forms of reality. Every interest that a personality has developed is a form of will, a set form in the omnipresent reality. And a mind is a system of interests. There is no reason why these interests should not become active, and thus conscious, again. They certainly should do so if their object still exists and their activity can have some effect in the realization of their goals.

The whole question of whether a mind may live on, after the death of the body, would therefore seem to depend upon the nature of its interests and the possibility of their realization without the body. Interests in the body and its achievements would necessarily become inactive. The whole mass of physical habits and desires of the flesh would thus be lost. The minds of animals and the animal interests of man must cease to operate when the body dies. But a great range of other interests of a well developed personality would remain.

Our value experience is determined, not by our relation to physical things, but by the interrelation of our mental operations. So long as these were harmonious life would be happy. The richness of that life would depend upon the richness of the set of interests developed in things independent of the body. Beauty is experienced in the activity of imagination and could still be pursued, though not in its familiar sensory forms. But since all the world is full of qualities we would form new habits of attending to these instead of attending only to those associated with our sense organs.

Further, it should surely be possible to develop new

means of communication with other minds. In telepathy there is already evidence that this is possible when we become more interested in another personality than in our own sensations. This is very difficult so long as our habit is to attend to these as media of communication. But when the familiar sensations are gone this habit must disappear, new means of communication will be sought, and if they can be found the interest in other persons will again become active. But it will have to be a positive interest in their welfare or it will make for unhappiness. A selfish or antisocial interest would clash with the will to the greatest good of all concerned, which will still be the fundamental form of will in each person. Thus hatred and pride developed here may be expected to make a person unhappy hereafter, until they are overcome, while love will make for happiness.

Finally, the truth interest could still be active. The body as a means of investigation and information would be gone. But there would be personalities and their relations as subject of inquiry; the relation of personality to the world would open new channels for research; perhaps even some operations of the physical world itself may still be felt and investigated.

Memory should be carried with us into the next life, for the function of the brain is simply to present objects—qualities, shapes, motions, etc. Each object as presented is merely present, whether its presentation is due to the sense organs or to imagination. The mind must carry its own past experience with it, subconsciously, in order to see in the newly presented object something with which it is familiar, something *like* the experience of the past. The dependence of memory upon the brain

would seem to be due to the normal mind's habit of attending only to what is presented to it by its body—the body and what it can achieve through the body being the original and ever dominant interest of the normal earthly life.

Thus the answer to the question of our chapter is that man begins to develop a soul as soon as he develops interests that do not depend upon his body for their fulfillment. The soul is an organized system of such interests. Man is not born with a soul. He grows it. Its growth is essentially a moral process and it is one in which human beings can help or hinder each other. The soul developed in this life is more or less rich in the range of its interests. It is more or less well integrated. If it is selfish, or involves hatreds, it is warped and is bound to suffer until it can overcome these tendencies. It will be free, after death, from the habits of the flesh, good and bad, but not from the effect these have had in determining the direction of its interests—proud, self-centered and vindictive, or genuinely concerned with the greatest good. Only the latter types of interest make for true harmony in the soul and therefore for happiness. But the soul, at death, has not finished growing. Death is the beginning of a new life, in which the soul will develop old and new social interests and interests in beauty and truth. Above all, it can go on growing in the knowledge of God and in the joy of working in harmony with his will.

THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR IMMORTALITY

This conception of the future life is derived directly from an analysis of the nature of mind and its relation to the body. But the ground for faith in immortality is

enormously strengthened when we approach the question from the standpoint of our knowledge of God. In the next chapter we shall show reason to believe that God is not merely a higher will and moral demand immanent in ourselves, but also a supreme and all-embracing Person with an eternal, conscious purpose. We shall see that there seem to be some limits to his power; yet the possibilities which the universe may contain are beyond our guessing. The course of the evolution of life on earth has revealed amazing new potentialities of the universe at every stage; and there is no reason to think this life has exhausted its resources. The power of God and the further possibilities of the universe would have to be small indeed if they could not provide fresh means of communication and development to minds such as ours will be when they have left the body behind. Perhaps they may provide opportunity for further development even of the lives of infants—a hope for which the merely psychological evidence provides no basis.

From a faith in the eternal power of God it is a short step to faith in immortality. For God as immediately known to us is a will to the production of the greatest possible good in the lives of persons. He wills the continued life and wholesome development of individuals. And his demand upon us is that we should pursue the same end. It cannot be that God makes a moral demand upon us which he does not himself observe. So we must believe that the whole eternal power of God, in accord with his eternal purpose (assuming the validity of the argument of our next chapter), is directed to the cultivation and development of finite personalities like ourselves. No substitute for such individual, personal immortality could meet the demands of the moral will.

And those demands will surely be met, for the moral will is God within us.

MORAL OBJECTIONS TO IMMORTALITY

Finally, something should be said in answer to the objections to the doctrine of immortality that have been made on moral grounds. The Communist charge that religion is "the opiate of the proletariat" has been urged particularly against the doctrine of immortality. It has been called a device of the ruling class to persuade the dispossessed to be content with their lot, promising "pie in the sky when you die" for those who remain faithful servants in this life. John Dewey and others have also urged that speculation about a future life only turns people's attention away from the problems of this life, and should therefore be avoided.

Now it may be admitted that designing people have sometimes made illegitimate use of religious truths. But this does not make a truth any less true. Further, such objections as Dewey urges are pertinent only against a conception of immortality that divorces the status in the future life entirely from behavior and achievements on earth. As has been shown in this chapter, the future life to which we look forward is one in which the higher developments of personality begun in this life will be continued. It therefore makes those higher developments all the more important.

The fact that a personality has eternal possibilities makes it all the more important to make the most of its initial stages in this life. Every act here acquires the greater significance by reason of its repercussions in eternity. Not only is the importance of the moral law en-

hanced, but the value of the principle of neighbor-love is specially emphasized. True happiness hereafter depends upon cultivation of a personality in harmony with the will to the greatest good. And everything that can be done to assist the higher development of personality in this life is a contribution to the enrichment of a life that is eternal. The task of making the most of the opportunities of this life is rendered, not less significant, but infinitely more so, by the recognition that the life which we help or hinder by our activity is not limited to three score years and ten.

In particular, the right of the individual to freedom of conscience, and therefore to freedom of information and inquiry and freedom of speech, attains its full significance only when it is recognized that any attempt to limit these freedoms may enslave and inhibit the development of an immortal soul. Any imposition of bad conditions upon individuals or classes that warps their spiritual development, puts temptation in their way, causes them to do wrong, is a crime against the eternal. It was this that Jesus had in mind when he said, "But whoso shall cause one of these little ones which believe on me to stumble, it is profitable for him that a great millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be sunk into the depth of the sea" (Matt. 18:6).

The Christian doctrine of the supreme value of the individual soul thus lies at the basis of our liberties. It teaches that all differences of race, station, physique, mentality, color or sex are insignificant compared to the fact that a human being is an immortal soul, responsible for himself directly to God, and a child of God whom God loves. Those who think that the social status of the

humbler classes of men on earth could be advanced by the abandonment of faith in immortality have completely failed to grasp the significance of this faith in the course of history. It is one of the great pillars on which has always rested the democratic doctrine of the dignity of man.

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 C H A P T E R F O U R  
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What Is God Like?

GOD IN US AS WILL, NOT IDEA

WITH THE understanding of the nature and destiny of man developed in the last chapter we are in a better position to understand the nature of God and his relation to man. We see the whole course of life on earth as beginning and ending with God, and God as present and active all the way through. As we have already seen, we know God immediately as active within ourselves—a will to the greatest good of all concerned that asserts its moral authority over all our other desires. This will, however, as it operates in us, does not at first carry with it a clear consciousness of its own end. It is impossible that it should; for the very young child is not aware of the existence of other selves as centers of experience separate from his own. We cannot pursue the good of others until we are aware of their existence. So the divine will in us pursues the greatest good that is seen and recognized as greatest by each individual mind. The individual mind may fail to see some possibilities of good; it may make mistakes as to which is greatest. But the divine will in us establishes a desire and a sense of obligation to be true to the *greatest*, even if it is a good for some other person but not for ourselves.

This view is perfectly in harmony with the opening verses of the Gospel of John: "In the beginning was the

Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men. . . . That was the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

This text has been much misunderstood by theologians because the Greek word *logos*, which means "mind," "reason," "thought" or "word" and is here translated "Word," is connected in Greek philosophy with Plato's notion of certain perfect "ideas" which are eternal objects of the divine mind. So it has been suggested that the "light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" is a certain set of perfect moral ideas. Thus the human conscience was thought to be a sort of instinctive knowledge of what is right — "the voice of God within us," telling us exactly what we should do. Against this interpretation many people pointed out that conscience makes many mistakes and so its ideas cannot be the voice of God.

Now what our analysis of the structure and development of the human mind shows us is that God is in us as a *will* to pursue the greatest good, not as an *idea* of what is the greatest good. Our intelligence has to find *what* is good. And the good changes so, with changing circumstances, that it is impossible to lay down any absolutely rigid rules. Conscience is indeed "the voice of God within us" in so far as it demands that we try to find out what is the greatest good possible in every situation and strive to produce and maintain it. If we set aside our prejudices and favoritisms conscience will always demand this. But it is a great mistake to think that any particularly strong and vivid idea of what is right in a

certain situation (which is what is ordinarily meant by conscience) is the voice of God.

The words in John's Gospel would seem to agree with this view. The word *logos* in most Greek philosophy meant much more than a perfect idea. And it means much more for the Gospel writer. It is a creative power and life. It is the "life" that is "the light of men." And life, while it may have ideas, is much more, and may exist without them. It is primarily feeling and striving, i.e., will. The *logos*, if we use that term, is the creative will, feeling and striving after the good as it feels and sees it. In that process it has developed all the forms of life. Each one seeks the good; but each one has a limited vision; it can err and produce evil and destroy greater goods than it produces.

It is therefore correct to say that all the forms of life are created by God and that God is in them all. But it is not correct to say that each is and does exactly what God, from the beginning, planned it should be and do. That conception of God would make him directly responsible for all the evil of the world. God did not specifically plan either the sweetness of honey, or the sting of the adder, or the misery of disease. God, in his activity in animate nature, seeks the good in and through each living thing as it is seen from the standpoint of that living thing, not as it is seen from some all-inclusive standpoint that sees and knows all things, planning every detail from beginning to end.

INFINITE MIND AND FINITE MINDS

This does not mean that there is in God no higher consciousness, no eternal plan. A mind with an eternal consciousness and an eternal plan might well initiate a

growing, creative process, which would be beyond its direct control in detail and yet would, as a whole and in the long run, fit into the eternal plan—a plan which might well provide for the continuous development of relatively independent individuals within the whole.

This is exactly what is suggested by our analysis of the structure and development of mind. We have traced the life and mind of man back to an initial act of will which found on this planet conditions that made possible a new kind of constructive activity, with almost infinite possibilities of varied development. These conditions, combining water, earth and air with a certain narrow range of temperature variations, astronomers tell us are a very rare phenomenon. Probably they exist nowhere else in the universe, unless it be on our sister planet, Mars. However that may be, when these new forms of physical activity appeared in space, space (the reality that is everywhere) responded to them. The response was a constructive interest in the new physical forms and qualities. The resulting experience felt good so long as it was successfully constructive. It felt bad when the result of activity was disintegration of the new structure and thus a disappointment of the constructive interest. Thus the process of interested, vital activity went on—a process of attentive feeling and striving, building up a new form of body that could maintain itself, grow and multiply itself.

Now any single interest-process is absorbed in its own object. It does not of itself involve a memory of the purposive act that initiated it, nor of the ultimate goal which that act may have in view. For example, a student writing an essay has to look up a certain fact in a book. He takes up the book to search for the fact.

Presently he is absorbed in the interest of reading the book. He has forgotten the purpose for which he took the book up. Something must occur to bring his attention back to this original purpose or it would be forgotten altogether. The new interest goes ahead, oblivious of its origin.

Something like this must have occurred in the initiation of the creative process of life on earth. Assuming that there is an eternal conscious mind, with an eternal purpose, this mind would see the opportunity for creative activity and development of new individual lives on this planet. It would react with constructive, interested attention to the new situation. This act would be an act of will (feeling and striving) seeking to control the new physical form in ways felt as good, and going on to develop new forms and new goods, always the greatest possible good. The new interest-process would be aware of its own object, the physical form and quality, and would strive to maintain and increase what it there found as good. It would manifest adaptive reaction and persistency with varied effort. But it would have no surviving consciousness of the act of will that initiated it, nor of the ultimate purpose held by the mind that performed that act of will.

The originating mind could be aware of the new interest-process, and of the goal it was intended to pursue, and of its success or failure. But the creative interest-process itself would be absorbed in its own object, unaware that it was a part of a larger mind. It would thus become a new and independent individual, a life with its own body, gradually developing as a distinct center of consciousness.

In a mind that has only one distinct body through

which to express itself, it is a mistake and a failure to let any single interest-process get beyond control of the originating center of consciousness. But an eternal consciousness would have a multitude of distinct bodies through which to express itself. And its purpose would be to produce independent, individual minds, which could develop a range of unique experiences to enrich the experience of the universal mind. In particular, the development of independent, individual minds would make possible the creation of a unique range of values, the social values, including love. Love can be experienced only when there are two or more relatively independent minds. And if there are two or more minds only one of them can be infinite (embracing all experience). The others must be limited, finite, or they would be identical. Being finite these other minds must be independent, erring, and sometimes opposed to the will of their creator. But that is the price even God must pay for having other individuals, with independent minds, to love.

If there is an eternal, conscious mind with an eternal purpose, and if it was this mind that initiated the process of creative activity of life and mind which we call the course of evolution and of human history, then our minds are specific interest-processes within the universal mind, working more or less in harmony with the purpose for which we were created. The universal mind could be aware of us and share our consciousness, though we could not share his.

We must not assume, however, that the relation between our mind and the universal mind (if there is such) would be exactly the same as that between a single interest-process and the human mind in which it occurs.

Our minds are much more complex than any single interest-process and have bodies of their own, a fact which gives them a much greater independence. Another analogy would be that of such free-moving bodies as the white corpuscles of the blood stream, which live much like independent organisms and yet are an organic part of a larger organism. Another analogy, suggesting a still greater independence, is that of parent and children. No analogy is perfect. All are misleading in some respects. But of this we can be sure, that if our minds are the product of the activity of a larger mind, then there must remain some sort of organic relation between them.

POSSIBILITY OF AN ETERNAL CONSCIOUSNESS

It is time to face the main question. Is there a larger mind than our own from which all life and mind have sprung? Is God, as known within us and active in the whole development of life from its inception, an agency that had its first beginnings with the first act of will which constituted the first throb of terrestrial life? Or was that first act of will the conscious act of a mind that existed beforehand?

We have already seen reason to believe that qualities more or less akin to those that we feel in sensation are properties of space, the omnipresent reality. They are not the special creation of the molecules of our brains, but are displayed everywhere. We have also seen that it is space that feels and strives, not the molecules of the brain. It would be most extraordinary, therefore, if a reality that is *capable* of feeling the changing variety of qualities that everywhere flow through it should never have felt anything until a few thousand years ago on earth. It would be strange, too, if a reality that is capa-

ble, in small individual organisms, of attending to its feelings in such a way that it becomes conscious should practice this attention only in those organisms.

In brief, once we have recognized that it is space, the omnipresent reality, that feels and is conscious, not just certain minute units of physical energy, there is little reason for thinking that feeling and consciousness do not exist until physical energy has developed the special forms or organization with which *our* consciousness is associated.

Some say that while it is possible that there is an eternal mind, there being no evidence against it, yet there is no evidence for it. They claim that it is just as plausible to think that feeling and consciousness originated along with the development of the nervous system as to think that they are an eternal feature of reality. They are willing to swallow the implausibility that a reality capable of consciousness should have remained unconscious until awakened by certain minute changes in the structure or arrangement of certain molecules; or they choose to believe that these minute changes made that reality capable of consciousness even though it was not capable of it before.

In saying that there is no evidence *for* an eternal consciousness these thinkers are looking for evidence of the wrong sort. *Our* consciousness is concerned with the special purposive behavior of a particular body, directing it to certain special goals and adapting it to special circumstances. Those who say there is no evidence of consciousness outside of human and animal life mean that there is no evidence of such special adaptive behavior of anything outside of human and animal life. Nature does not modify her laws in order specially to adapt herself to

human needs or to reward human beings according to their desert.

But should we expect that an eternal consciousness would manifest itself in special adaptations of natural laws to human needs? What ground is there for believing that feeling and striving could have such effects as would be recognizable as special changes in the natural order made for a moral purpose? So far as our evidence up to this point goes, feeling and striving have no effect upon the course of physical events except to facilitate or retard certain chemical changes in some of the very unstable carbon compounds of living cells. This implies some very slight effect upon the operations of physical energy. In the delicately balanced structure of a living organism a very slight effect upon certain nerve changes may make a great difference in behavior. In the long-run course of the physical world, spread over the immensities of space and time, the influence of a universal world-mind may also be great. But there is no evidence from mind as we know it to suggest that an eternal and universal consciousness would be able to work miracles for man's special benefit, enlightenment or punishment.

EVIDENCES OF DESIGN

Is there, then, any evidence of the long-run influence of mind upon the course of the physical world? Yes, it can be found in two facts. The first is the almost universal predominance of beauty over ugliness in nature. Beauty and ugliness are two distinct possibilities in the arrangement of material things. If the universe were a chaos it might be expected to throw up the one as often as the other. But almost everywhere it is beautiful.

Nearly all the ugliness is made by man. Inanimate nature is never ugly. Even deserts, ice floes, oceans, storms and volcanoes are beautiful, however uncomfortable and destructive they may be to human flesh. Animate things in nature are rarely ugly, though often unpleasant or dangerous to man.

Animate nature, however, is the product of myriads of special, adaptive feeling-reactions of living things, and must therefore be much less subject to the long-term influence of the eternal consciousness. Yet some such long-term influence in favor of beauty must have been operative here too. For it is very easy for the shortsighted feeling and striving reactions of living things to create ugliness — as man discovers as soon as he starts to interfere with nature and build cities. Since it is so easy to produce ugliness it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the vast predominance of beauty in nature must be due to the design of some higher mind.

The validity of this argument is not affected if beauty is regarded as merely subjective, i.e., merely a product of the mind perceiving it. The argument simply points to the fact that nature is such as to affect human minds predominantly with an experience of beauty. It may be that nature is marvelously adapted to have this effect upon mind. Or it may be that mind is marvelously adapted to receive this effect from nearly all the various forms of nature. In either case the adaptation is equally marvelous and indicates a long-run designing influence in favor of beauty, for beauty has no survival value for the struggling animal, and random, undesigned activity most commonly produces ugliness.

A second evidence of the influence of design in the universe is the peculiar adaptation of our earth and solar

system to its function as the medium for the development of rational, moral individuals. To say this is not to argue that this is "the best of all possible worlds," that "whatever is is best," that everything is made by God for a special purpose and exactly fulfills his will. Traditional theology, with its theory of special creation, made God directly responsible for all the evils of nature. But this ascription of responsibility was due to the inadequacy of ancient science. Primitive philosophers, lacking any knowledge of the laws of physics and biology, borrowed an idea from religion to fill the gaps in their knowledge of the world. Religion had developed the conviction that the moral law is determined and upheld by a mysterious superhuman power. So the primitive philosopher assumed that this same superhuman power must be the explanation of all the mysteries of nature — the movement of sun, moon and stars, the change of the seasons, the reproduction of life, the origin of all things. This theory of special creation still survives in religious thought today, in spite of our knowledge of physical laws and evolution. It is responsible for much trouble to religious minds, who wonder why God should have produced a world so full of evil.

But in our study of the relation of mind and matter we saw reason to believe that the direct influence of mind upon matter is very small. And we have seen no reason to believe that an eternal and universal consciousness would have any greater influence at any one place and time. We therefore should not expect miracles. Nor should we expect the world to be adapted in every detail to our comfort and convenience. The long-range influence of the eternal consciousness, working out its long-range plan, has been able to provide at least one place

in the universe where finite minds, developing their own individuality from a single act of will, could find a medium of expression in constructive control of some of the processes of the physical world. So far as we know, this is the only way in which finite, individual, independent minds could be developed. They cannot be constructed as mature and complex entities all at once, but must begin with the single, minimal act of feeling and striving, and must grow by their own efforts. We may assume that if there were a better way the eternal consciousness would have chosen it.

It is not difficult to see what are the requirements for the development of a rational, moral individual. There must, in the first place, be a medium that the individual can control, some kind of material with which he can work. This material must react upon his feelings according to regular natural laws, so that he can learn to anticipate its reactions. Only a world of natural laws is a possible home for rational beings. The reactions of the material must, further, give him satisfactions, so as to encourage further efforts on his part. But they must also present him with problems, difficulties in the way of satisfaction, or he would never think, never develop his mind. So life must have some possibilities of dissatisfaction and disappointment. Finally, he must be able to become aware of other minds and create a society. This sets before him the moral demand to concern himself with the good of others besides himself and also opens up to him that vast new range of values found in society, especially those found in love. If individuals are to know love and moral responsibility they must be to some extent dependent on each other, bringing joy

and sorrow upon each other as well as themselves and sharing joy and sorrow with each other.

Now this world is not perfectly adapted to our comfort and convenience; but it meets the above requirements and serves very well its main function as a medium and a stimulus for the development of rational moral individuals. Some religious thinkers argue that it serves this purpose so well that, after all, we are entitled to think that it is perfectly adapted to God's purpose and that God is absolutely all-powerful, able to introduce any change at any moment into the laws of nature, but wisely refraining because it is better for us to be left to solve our problems for ourselves. This, however, is carrying the conclusion much further than the evidence warrants. It is even against the evidence.

It cannot be shown that the amount of pain in the world is all morally necessary. On the other hand, it is our duty to reduce suffering; and in general we find that people are morally better if we can succeed in reducing suffering or fending it off from them. It cannot be to our moral good to suffer from evils that we have not the knowledge or power to avoid, however good we may be. The evils of tornadoes, floods and earthquakes fall on guilty and innocent alike; and there is no evidence that the inhabitants of areas thus affected are better or worse than others. Disease is, in part, a moral problem, but much more a scientific one. As science saves us from disease we are not made morally worse. It is evident from all these considerations that the order of the physical world cannot be regarded as perfectly adjusted to man's animal and spiritual needs. Some features of the physical world must therefore be regarded as beyond the im-

mediate control of a God who wills for man all possible good.

Now our knowledge of the relation of body and mind suggests that, though the long-range influence of mind on matter may be great, and though upon certain delicate organizations of matter a single mental act may have decisive results, yet the immediate influence of mind upon matter in general, outside of living cells, is negligible. This, it would seem, would exactly explain the great but imperfect extent to which the earth is adapted to the habitation of man. We have already mentioned the fact that this planet is believed by astronomers to be perhaps the only place in the universe, besides Mars, suitable for life as we know it. All the rest of the stars and their satellites are much too hot or too cold, lack air or water or other necessities of plant and animal life. Our solar system is apparently due to an "accident" in the history of the sidereal universe which seems to be extraordinarily rare and perhaps absolutely unique. Yet without it the universe (if there is no eternal consciousness) would have carried all its potentialities of life and mind, joy and beauty, forever unrealized. It is difficult indeed to believe that so extremely rare an event, fraught with such momentous consequences, could really be an accident. Yet if there is an eternal consciousness, able to exercise a very slight but continuous influence upon the course of the physical world, its long-range, planned activity could well be understood as the cause of that rare event.

Thus we can see the working of the eternal mind in the preparation of our earthly home, as well as in the creation of finite life. The eternal mind is responsible for the beauty of the universe and for the general adaptation of this planet to the needs of our lives, but not for

all the details of its structure, nor for all the forms of development of life. The world of inanimate and animate nature is one for which we must be grateful to God. But it is not entirely shaped according to his will or ours. To some extent we can work with him to improve it. But we must accept the fact that there is little in the course of nature that even God can immediately change.

In answer, then, to the charge that there is no evidence of the existence of an eternal consciousness we can say, first, that we have no right to look for evidence in the form of miracles, because these are beyond the reach of any power that we have reason to believe an eternal consciousness would possess. Second, that in the predominance of beauty in nature, and in the preparation of the earth to be a home and medium for the development of finite individual minds, we have strong evidence of the only kind that we have a right to expect.

CAN THE UNCONSCIOUS PRODUCE CONSCIOUSNESS?

In addition to these evidences of the operation of an eternal consciousness upon the order of the physical world, the very existence of finite consciousness on earth is evidence of the existence of an eternal consciousness. Either there must be an eternal consciousness or the production of consciousness on earth is a miracle—and a miracle occurring without even a God to perform it. Obviously no scientific and rational mind should believe in such a miracle.

A miracle is an event—something happening in the course of time—without the sort of antecedents that could explain it as part of the regular causal order. The eternal existence of matter and natural law would not be a miracle; nor would the eternal existence and operation

of feeling and consciousness; nor the normal, minimal influence of consciousness upon the physical world exercised in favor of beauty or in bringing about the "accident" that produced our earth; nor the natural behavior of life on earth. All these things constitute the nature of matter and mind and are in accord with their regular functioning. But, if the eternal consciousness should exercise an influence upon physical events that is beyond the regular effect of mind upon matter (due to their both being operations of the one omnipresent reality, space), that would be a miracle. If a finite mind should exert such an *irregular* effect upon matter it would be a miracle. Similarly, if matter should exert an effect upon mental activity other than the effects it produces in the *regular* causal order, that would be a miracle.

Now matter, as we have seen, affects mental activity through the changing qualities of space (color, sound, smell, warmth, etc.) which are correlated with the changing tensions of physical events in space. Physical changes produce qualitative changes. New physical arrangements present new sensory qualities. But sensory qualities are not mental activities. The mental activities are the *feeling* of the physical events and the qualities of space associated with them, the *striving* to maintain or change these qualities and physical processes, the *liking* and *disliking* them, *attending* to them and to other mental activities, *expecting* or *anticipating* new ones, *recognizing* some as familiar, *noticing* and *thinking* about the relations between them.

If consciousness is not eternal, then either it came into being without a cause or it was caused by what existed before it. If it came into being without a cause that certainly was a miracle. So let us see whether it could have

been caused by the regular (i.e., nonmiraculous) operation of the factors that might have existed before it. These would be the physical operations of space, with their changing qualities, and probably feeling and striving, since it seems possible for these latter to occur unconsciously. Consciousness, as we have seen, involves an act of attention to two or more processes of feeling and striving in their relation to each other and to physical events, qualities and other mental activities. It is an act that holds these together so that passage of time is noticed and memory and expectation are made possible. Our question is, therefore, whether this new act of attention could be caused by the regular operation of the physical activities, qualitative changes, and unconscious feelings and strivings, which may be supposed to have preceded it.

When the question is asked this way it is apparent that the answer is "No." The *regular* operation of physical changes produces only other physical changes. New physical changes are all produced in accord with natural laws, but they are simply new spatio-temporal relations of the old units of physical energy — not new kinds of activity, like an act of attention. They are correlated with new physical qualities (color, etc.) which may or may not become objects of feeling. But this feeling would be an act of the same kind as other feelings, only the kind of quality felt being new. So if previous feelings were unconscious this would be too. If all feeling were conscious, but consciousness not eternal, then feeling would not be eternal. That would merely shift the problem back to where this conscious feeling began. We would have to suppose that some slight change in arrangement of physical energy produced both feeling of

qualities and consciousness of these feelings at the one moment. And this would be still more miraculous.

In brief, the production of consciousness by unconscious processes would be a sort of causal production that science cannot logically admit. Supporters of the theory of "emergent evolution" are mistaken in thinking that it is simply analogous to the emergence of new forms of physical things and organisms. These, as they point out, present new qualities to our senses and manifest new modes of physical activity which result in new effects upon other things. This sort of emergence of new things and organisms is explicable (at least theoretically) in terms of the regular causal relations of physical events and the normal process of qualitative change accompanying physical change. But this analogy breaks down when we remember that mental activity is not a quality and that it is uniquely different in kind from physical activity. And conscious mental activity is uniquely different from unconscious feeling. It is a distinctive process of attention, interested in a different kind of object, superimposed upon feelings which may otherwise be unconscious, but not derived from them.

The only way, therefore, to avoid a hypothesis that would involve the unscientific and irrational notion of a miracle happening by accident is to recognize that consciousness must be eternal. The act of will which initiated the life process on earth was the act of a conscious and eternal mind. It was an interest in creative activity that would develop new forms of both body and mind. The first product of the creative act was the initiating of a process of feeling and striving which had to work first with a minimum of that attentive interrelation of feelings we call consciousness. Perhaps it—the first and

simplest form of life—was conscious only in flashes; perhaps not at all. But the original act of conscious interest established a "set" of the will which produced that attentive process we call consciousness as occasion offered, and developed at length into the multiple forms of conscious life we know.

THE ETERNAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SOURCE OF THE MORAL LAW

That set form of will, thus imparted to the stream of life at its inception, and passed on to every living organism, makes every act of feeling-striving a striving to maintain and produce what is felt as the greatest present good and anticipated as the greatest possible future good. Thus, when the organism becomes aware of possibilities of good outside its own immediate experience, it strives to produce them as it does its own. And when the greatest possible good is seen as a good of some other person which can be realized only by sacrifice of some lesser good of the self, it still demands that the self should pursue that greatest good. Thus that fundamental form of will imparted to all life by the eternal consciousness becomes, in man, a demand felt within him that he concern himself with the good of others equally with the good of self. At this point, therefore, we are able to link up the knowledge obtained through analysis of our religious and moral experience with that obtained in this analysis of the interrelation of mental and physical activity. We are able to identify the eternal consciousness, which we find to be implied by the nature and history of mind and matter, with the superhuman source of the moral experience. Without this identification the existence of an eternal consciousness would have no religious or

moral significance. What would it matter to us to know that our consciousness is derived from and shared by a universal and eternal consciousness if we could not know that that consciousness wills our good and seeks in and through us the good of all?

But it makes a great difference to our religious and moral outlook to know that the power we find in us as source and sanction of the moral law is eternal, constantly conscious of us and interested in our welfare. Even though we see that we cannot expect the special intervention of the eternal, conscious agent in our favor in control of natural events, this knowledge gives us confidence that our spiritual welfare is safe in his care. We can look to him with thankfulness for the beauty of the world, and for the provision of our earthly home to supply our needs in accord with intelligible natural laws. We can see that the evils of the world are beyond his immediate control, but that his will is with us to strengthen us in all our efforts to overcome them. We can know that the will that seeks the greatest good of all is the eternal part of us, that the evil, in the long run, must die, but that all that is good in the spiritual part of the personality we build shall live eternally.

OMNIPOTENCE AND THE TRINITY

We have arrived at this conception of God through an analysis of moral and religious experience in the light of modern scientific knowledge. Let us now compare it with the traditional conceptions of Christian theology; we shall find the differences are not very great.

In our view God is a person; indeed he is the only complete person, for he includes all others and they are

rooted and grounded in him. A human person is an interrelated set of physical and mental activities of a part of space. The personality of God includes the whole of space and the whole range of physical and mental activities. Just as our person includes some semi-independent organisms, living their own life and not always entirely in harmony with the good of every other part or with our will, so does the person of God. But though evil is possible within his being his *will* is always good, always willing the greatest good of all, and therefore morally perfect. He is omniscient in the sense that he has all the knowledge that exists. For all knowledge occurs in him and he shares the consciousness of all his creatures. He is not all-powerful in the sense of being able to do *anything*. Every theology has had to recognize that some things are at least logically or morally impossible to God. We have to go further and say that many things are also physically impossible. But he is all-powerful in the sense that he includes all the power that exists in the universe. There is no power beyond his. He is also infinite in the sense that he is not limited by anything beyond himself. There is no being beyond him.

Christianity has also said that God is three persons in one, the Father, the Son (identified with the Logos, or eternal mind), and the Holy Spirit. The reason for this tripartite conception of God lies in religious experience. Man feels God within him; that is the Holy Spirit. The Christian sees a perfect life in Christ, concludes that he was divine, and identifies his life and mind with that of the eternal. But philosophical thought sees that its God must be more than either an eternal mind or a moral power in man. So it frames the final conception of God

the Father as the inclusive source and sustainer of all. It is then recognized that in each of these concepts God is personal. So he must be three persons. Then to save the unity of God these three persons are said to be "of one substance."

Now the difficulty in this conception has come from the traditional notion of a person as a separate soul, and of the soul as a single separate piece of substance, having its own absolutely private consciousness. How, on this view, could the Holy Spirit be a single person inside every human person? How could the three divine persons be one substance? These problems disappear when we learn the true nature of personality. If we are to speak of "substance" there is only one in all the universe. That is space. And a "person" is simply a special, organized set of the activities of space. These sets of activities can be organically related to each other, so that one person can be an organic part of another. And since consciousness depends upon a special act of attention within a personality there may be different levels of consciousness within the one person. We thus have no difficulty in seeing how God can be in man, and man in God, and how yet God and man, in each instance, can be distinct persons. And all are gathered up in the one supreme and universal person.

Christian theology, in the doctrine of the trinity, has attempted to give a true account of God as known in religious experience and thought. But it had to try to do it in terms of the inadequate and inaccurate concepts developed by Greek philosophy. Modern scientific philosophy gives us more accurate concepts and more adequate terms by means of which we can make the matter clear. We thus see that the ancient theologians, who distin-

guished between God the Father and the Holy Spirit, were justified in what they tried to express, even though the terms and concepts they had to use made it impossible for them to avoid apparent contradiction. In a later chapter we will inquire how far they were justified in speaking of Jesus as God the Son.